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Legally Speaking

June 15, 2000

Injuries While Traveling to or From Work

General Rule: Routine travel to and from work is not compensable. However, there are several exceptions to this rule which complicate these cases. Each of these exceptions is discussed further below.

1. When the employee is provided transportation by the nature of the terms and conditions of the employment.

The key question to ask in determining whether or not this exception applies is: "Did the employer furnish transportation in furtherance of the employment?" It is not enough that transportation was simply furnished. In Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Grynkewich, 122 Ga. App. 765 (1970), the employee was killed in an accident on the way home from the office in a company car. Benefits were awarded although there was quite a vigorous dissent. This case does not hold that a claim is compensable just because the employee is injured in a company car. Rather, there must be some causal connection between the nature of the employment and the travel. In this case, the claimant was on his way home from a business trip. Instead of proceeding directly home from the trip, he stopped by the office to pick up some papers before going home. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the stop at the office to pick up the papers was simply an extension of the business trip so that the drive from the office to home was not a routine to and from work trip. Had the employee driven directly home without stopping at the office, the accident would clearly have been compensable. This case does not appear to be a stretch to avoid a denial of benefits simply because the employee stopped by the office before heading home.

The same issue is presented in Jose Andrade Painting v. Jaimes, 207 Ga. App. 596 (1993). The employer in this case was a painting contractor who met his employees each morning at an apartment complex where many of them lived. Because many of the workers did not have transportation, employees would get to job sites in carpools using employee personal vehicles and vehicles furnished by the employer. On occasion, the employer would purchase gas for those who used their personal cars. However, he never paid employees for their travel time. The claimant in this case was injured in a car owned and driven by a coworker who was not reimbursed for gas. The claim was denied because transportation was not furnished by the employer and he was not paid for travel time. Had he been riding in an employer-furnished vehicle, this would arguably have been a compensable event as the claimant had no other way to work. In that instance, transportation would have been furnished in furtherance of the employment.

2. The accident occurs while doing some act required by or beneficial to the employer on the way to or from work.

An example of this exception is found in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Moore, 115 Ga. App. 295 (1967). The claimant was an employee of a vending company. During the course of the day, he collected money from his customers. He was required to bring this money to the office at the start of the following day. The claimant was injured in an auto accident on the way to work with the money. Although he was driving his own car and was not paid for his travel time, the Court awarded benefits since he was doing something required by the employer and in furtherance of its business.

3. The employee is on call and furnished or reimbursed for transportation costs

In Lewis Wood Preserving Co. v. Jones, 110 Ga. App. 689 (1964), the employee sometimes received a call to report to the employer’s plant at night. He was paid additional sums whenever he responded to one of these calls. On the date of the accident, he was killed on the way to the plant in response to a special call. The Court awarded benefits reasoning that this was not a routine trip to work. Rather, he was an on call employee who was doing something in furtherance of the employer’s business at the time of the accident.

4. Traveling employees

The scope of employment is broader in the case of employees who travel. They are exposed to the "perils of the highway" which are compensable. Injuries occurring in hotels and motels are generally compensable as are injuries on the way to or from restaurants. Whether or not the employee is paid a per diem does not make a difference. However, there are some restrictions on the scope of employment. An employee who parties all night and takes a ride home with a stranger who then mugs him does not suffer a compensable event. The general rule in regard to traveling employees: if ministering to a personal need at the time of the injury (eating, sleeping, clothing), the accident is compensable.

5. The doctrine of continuous employment

Some employees are considered, by the nature of their job, to be continuously employed. An example is found in Barge v. City of College Park, 148 Ga. App. 480 (1978). In that case, the employee was a uniformed police officer on his way to work in a personal vehicle when he was shot and killed. In awarding benefits to the family, the Court held that an officer of the law is on duty or subject to call twenty-four hours a day. Accordingly, he was continuously employed and thus his death was compensable.

Legal Notes

PREMISE LIABILITY ISSUES

Sewell v. Hull/Storey Development, LLC, _____ Ga. App. _____, Case No. A99A-2447 (12/08/99). A lease which requires a landlord to maintain and repair common areas of a mall does not make the landlord liable for an attack, which occurs inside a business located in the mall. In this particular case, the plaintiff was seeking damages for injuries she sustained during a robbery, which occurred while she was working at a General Cinema theater located in Hall/Storey’s mall. Reading the pertinent lease agreement, the court held that the term "common area" clearly did not obligate the landlord to provide security inside the General Cinema’s theater. It was clear from a reading of the entire lease that the parties intended the landlord’s duties of repair, etc., to be limited to the common areas of the property and did not extend to areas surrendered to tenants for their use even where the lease allowed the landlord some limited right of entry to perform repairs, etc.

Etheridge v. Davis, ____ Ga. App. _____, Case No. A99A1844 (3/22/00). Summary judgment was granted to Colonnade Apartments after a tenant slipped and fell in his kitchen as a result of water that was leaking through the ceiling from an upstairs apartment and running down onto the kitchen floor. The problem had been reported to the apartment manager several months earlier, and had not been repaired. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the apartment complex, and stated that even though the landlord had a statutory duty to keep the premises in repair, he was not an insurer of the tenant’s safety. "Here, while there has been no repair of the problem leak, nothing done by the landlord prior to Davis’ fall, distracted him from the hazard created by the dripping water. Rather, knowing that the leak was persistent but unpredictable and that he would not be able to see water on the floor due to the white linoleum, Davis walked directly into the area where the water fell without looking at either the ceiling or the floor. Therefore, under the plain, palpable and undisputed facts, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment."

Bailey v. Jim’s Minut Market, ____ Ga. App. _____, Case No.A00A001 (2/9/00). Summary judgment was reversed in a case where an employee of a convenience store sold BBs to an unsupervised ten year old child, who, after taking the BBs home, shot a neighboring child the next day. Another employee of the convenience store had refused to sell BBs to the unsupervised child and testified that in her opinion selling BBs to a minor child, unaccompanied by an adult "created a very dangerous situation." The convenience store argued that the parents’ failure to properly supervise the child was a sufficient intervening cause to warrant a grant of summary judgment. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed the lower court’s decision granting summary judgment.

Hyatt Corp. v. Cook, ____ Ga. App. _____, Case No. A99A1770 (2/11/00). Hyatt Corporation was not liable for the action of an off-duty police officer in arresting a New Years Eve guest for disorderly conduct. Although the off-duty police officer was providing New Years Eve security for Hyatt, it was undisputed that Hyatt had not instructed the police officer concerning how to carry out his "general" security duties. Likewise, Hyatt did not instruct the officer to arrest the disorderly guest. The only information given to the officer by Hyatt was a statement from the manager and bartender that there was trouble in the bar area because patrons would not leave when asked. In addition, the bartender asked the officer to clear the lounge. There was no evidence that either the bartender or the manager gave any direction to the officer concerning how to ask patrons to leave. When the officer asked the disorderly guest to leave, he resisted the officer’s request and a confrontation resulted. The disorderly guest was subsequently arrested. See also, Wilson v. Waffle House, 235 Ga. App., 539, 510 S.E. 2d 105 (1998) and Rembert v. Arthur Schneider Sales, Inc., 28 Ga. App. 903, 432 S.E. 2d 809 (1993).

SLIP AND FALL

Shepherd v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., _____ Ga. App. _____, Case No. A99A-2128 (12/07/99). A regular store inspection procedure, which required employees to check the floors for spills, debris, etc., every 30 minutes, created a question of fact concerning whether or not Winn-Dixie had constructive knowledge of a 4-inch wide puddle of water in its produce department. The puddle had apparently been created by dripping water from ice which was used to refrigerate produce. The first prong a plaintiff must show to recover in a foreign substance slip and fall case is that the owner had either actual or constructive knowledge of a hazard. Constructive knowledge may be inferred where there is evidence that the owner did not have a "reasonable" inspection procedure. In order to prevail at summary judgment based on a lack of constructive knowledge, the owner must demonstrate not only that it had a reasonable inspection program in place, but that the program was actually being carried out at the time of the occurrence. In this particular case, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that Winn Dixie’s inspection procedures were reasonable. "What constitutes a reasonable inspection procedure varies with each case, depending on the nature of the business, the size of the store, the number of customers, the nature of the dangerous condition, and the store’s location." In this case, the court held that, where a supermarket fills a table with crushed ice and produce, knowing that customers will remove the produce and likely cause at least some of the ice to fall on the floor, the store creates a potential hazard to customers that may be very difficult to see and avoid. Thus, an inspection may be required more frequently than every 30 minutes. Summary judgment was reversed. The issue went back to the trial court so that a jury could decide what was "reasonable" under the facts of the case.

K-Mart Corp. v. Jackson, ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A0510 (7/16/99). Where employees are not instructed to patrol specific areas of a store at established intervals, testimony that employees are generally told to be on the look out for debris, spills, etc., while walking through a store, and that an employee "may" have been in the vicinity of a spill within fifteen minutes of a slip and fall, is not sufficient to obtain summary judgment and to establish that the proprietor exercised reasonable care in inspecting his premises. Jones v. Krystal, Co., 231 Ga. App. 102, 104-105 (d), 498 SE 2d 565 (1998).

Futch v. Super Discount Mkts d/b/a Cub Foods, ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A1023 (12/1/99). The presence of two puddles of a clear liquid in the general area where an invitee slips and falls is not sufficient to establish liability. In this particular case, the plaintiff testified that she was standing in front of a magazine rack, when she suddenly slipped and fell and that after falling, she noticed two clear puddles several feet away. There were no puddles, moisture, etc., in the area where the plaintiff fell. Likewise, the plaintiff’s clothing was not wet after she fell. "Regardless of the parties respective knowledge of these puddles, Futch must show that these puddles in fact caused her fall. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to grant summary judgment for the defendant." Simply stated, the court did not believe that the presence of two undisturbed puddles several feet from where the plaintiff fell was sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether Futch might have slipped in a similar puddle, particularly in light of Futch’s direct testimony that she saw no liquid on the floor where she fell and noticed no liquid on her hands or clothes.

EMPLOYMENT LAW ISSUES

Brown v. Allied Printing, Inc., ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A-1650 (12/06/99). Where an employee files a Title VII discrimination suit against an employer and alleges that his discharge for violation of a workplace rule constituted discrimination, the employee must show either that he did not violate a workplace rule or that other employees, who were not within the same protected group, violated a substantially similar workplace rule and were dealt more leniently. In this particular case, the employee, who was black, alleged that his discharge for violating his employer’s drug-free workplace rule constituted discrimination. A random drug test administered to the plaintiff came back positive. After a motion for summary judgment was filed by the employer, the court found that the plaintiff had presented no evidence that (1) he had not violated the workplace rule, or that (2) a similarly situated white employee was treated differently. As a consequence, summary judgment was granted and affirmed.

Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 156 F.3rd 581 (5th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court’s decisions in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, which created a standard for vicarious liability of employers in sexual harassment cases, are applicable to all claims brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This particular case dealt with alleged racial discrimination.

Clover v. Total Services, Inc., ___ F3d ___, Case No. 9709229 (11^th Cir.) dec’d. 5/27/99. For the purpose of a retaliation claim, participation in an employer’s internal investigation does not constitute a protected activity. The word "investigation" as used in Title VII refers to an EEOC investigation, not an employer’s internal investigation of an EEOC-related complaint. This holding is applicable to persons who are interviewed, or who give statements, and does not include the complaining party, who would be protected.

Kuehn v. Selton & Associates, Inc., ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A1904 (3/9/00). To be enforceable, a restrictive covenant cannot be too broad. For example, where a former employee covenants not to compete with his employer, the "territorial limitation" must be specified and should be closely tied to the area in which the employee himself actually worked. In this case, a restriction that limited the employee’s ability to compete for an indefinite time period was unenforceable because it did not specify the length of the restrictive covenant nor did it contain a specific territorial limitation. Instead, the restriction stated that the employee could not solicit business from "any" customers of the former employer. The restriction should have been limited to customers with whom the employee actually dealt or an area in which the employee had, himself, worked.

North Georgia Regional Education Service Agency v. Weaver, ____ Ga., Case No. S99G1287 (3/6/00). The Georgia Whistle Blower Statute, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4, only applies to public employers, and has no application to private employers.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE

Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, ____ Ga. ______, Case No. S99G0600 (3/6/00). A patient cannot maintain a fraud claim against a doctor, who fails to reveal prior cocaine use. The Informed Consent Statute, O.C.G.A. § 33-9-6.1, does not include a requirement that a doctor disclose aspects of his personal life that might adversely affect his professional performance.

Johnson v. Rodler, ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A2314 (2/10/00). While O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1.1 requires the filing of an expert’s affidavit any time an action for professional malpractice is filed, this requirement is not applicable to those claims grounded on a professional’s "intentional acts" which allegedly caused in injury to one with whom the professional had a professional relationship at the time. In this particular case, a physician was being sued for tortious interference with a patient’s employment, invasion of privacy, and fraud. The allegation was that the physician had misrepresented the patient’s ability to perform his work duties as a deputy sheriff. The court held that this was not an action for "malpractice" and did not require an expert’s affidavit to support the complaint.

Wilborn v. Blake, ____ Ga. App. ____ Case No. A99A1724 (3/9/00). Testimony in a medical malpractice case which shows nothing more than a mere difference in views as to the medical judgment exercised in a particular case, is insufficient to support an action for malpractice. Testimony by the plaintiff’s expert that "in his opinion, certain procedures should have been utilized" does not establish the applicable standard of care. The appropriate standard is that care and skill which, under like circumstances, and in similar conditions, is employed by the medical profession generally. When an expert testifies, his opinion must be based upon specified facts, and those facts must be supported by evidence admitted into the record, either through the testimony of witnesses or documentary evidence.

Abend v. Klaudt, ___ Ga. App. ____ Case No. A99A1862 (3/16/00). The five year statute of re-pose (O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71[b]) does not bar a foreign object medical malpractice action which is timely filed within the one year after the foreign object is discovered, or should have been discovered, even where the cause of action is not brought from more than five years after the doctor’s negligence, i.e., leaving the foreign object in the patient. The rationale is that a doctor’s failure to remove a foreign object constitutes a continuing tort so that the applicable statute of limitations does not begin to run until the negligence is discovered. This ruling is consistent with previous cases, which had held that where a surgeon negligently leaves a foreign object in a patient’s body a continuing tort exists, which tolls the otherwise applicable statute of limitations until the patient discovers or in the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered the object. Parker v. Vaughan, 124 Ga. App. 300, 302, 183 S.E. 2d 605 (1971).

Cardio TVP Surgical Associates, P.C. v. Gills, ____ Ga. _____ Case No. S99G1712 (5/1/00). O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1(b)(2) provides that the written consent given by a patient for surgery extends to any non-physicians who perform procedures during surgery under the direct supervision of the medical doctor, to whom the consent to surgery was given. In this particular case, a physician’s assistant was used to harvest veins but was working under the direct supervision of a physician to whom a consent to surgery had been given.

Ferro v. Boswell, ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A2435 (3/8/00). Where there is testimony that a physician has complied with the applicable standard of care, an action for medical malpractice does not exist based only on evidence of an unsuccessful outcome if the outcome is a "known complication" of the procedure at issue. In this particular case, the defendant performed a high tibial osteotomy. The purpose of the procedure was to realign a bone in the knee, shift where the patient bore her weight, and relieve arthritic pain. The procedure failed because the bone that was cut during the procedure did not grow back. The testimony at trial was that the failure was "non-union", which was a known complication of the procedure. The Court of Appeals upheld a defendant’s verdict after stating that testimony at trial established that the manner in which the defendant performed the procedure had complied with the applicable standard of care, and that the non-union was a "known complication."

UNINSURED MOTORIST ISSUES

Whirl v. Safeco Ins. Co., ____ Ga. App. A99A-2127 (12/20/99). In a case of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that when an insurance company seeks subrogation for uninsured motorist benefits paid to an insured, the action for subrogation must be filed within the original 2-year statute of limitations for the underlying personal injury.

GENERAL ISSUES

Waters v. Steak & Ale of Ga., Inc., ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A-166 (1/5/00). Bennigan’s obtained summary judgment and escaped liability for an altercation between one of its kitchen staff and Waters, who had come in the restaurant to use a pay phone. The court found that the employee was not acting within the scope of his employment since it was undisputed that the employee’s job duties were limited to activities within the restaurant’s kitchen, and that the employee had no authority to use physical force for any reason. The altercation arose after Waters’ female companion, who was intoxicated, claimed to be having a flash back about a former boyfriend, and ran out of the restaurant screaming. Waters went outside to check on his female companion and then attempted to re-enter the restaurant to use the pay phone. On the way back in the restaurant, Waters ran into several kitchen employees, who were either on their way home or going outside to check on Waters’ friend. An altercation ensued between Waters and 3-4 of the employees.

Richardson v. Barber, ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A1005 (12/3/99). This case involved a wrongful death settlement, in which the parents had a dispute concerning apportioning the settlement proceeds of $1,000,000.00. The mother had custody. The father had been in prison for most of the child’s life and had contributed very little in the way of support. The trial court held, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the father was entitled no more than $5,000. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(c)(6) provides that in a post-judgment hearing, the judge shall apportion any judgment according to each parent’s relations with the deceased child.

COVERAGE ISSUES

Southeastern Security Ins. Co. v. Lowe, ____ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A00A0635 (2/29/00). Southeastern Security Insurance Company was able to obtain summary judgment after a third party filed suit seeking to enforce a judgment, which had been obtained against a Southeastern insured without obtaining personal service on the insured. The Court of Appeals held that an insured must be personally served with a copy of the complaint before the insured’s insurance company has an obligation to pay a judgment returned against the insured. In this particular case, the plaintiff was unable to personally serve the insured so service by publication became the plaintiff’s only option. While service by publication is sufficient for a plaintiff to recover uninsured motorist benefits from his own carrier, it will not support payment of liability coverage from the insurance company for the defendant.

Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, ___ Ga. App. ____, Case No. A99A1748 (2/29/00). The Court of Appeals upheld an exclusion, which was contained in an amendatory endorsement to an automobile policy. The endorsement stated "(W)e do not provide liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage to you or any family member residing in your household, (1) if intra-familial tort immunity applies; or (2) to the extent that the limits of liability of this coverage exceeds the limits of liability required by law if intra-familial coverage tort immunity does not apply." The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether or not the exclusion was "camouflaged" since it was contained in an amendatory endorsement and not on the dec page. The underlying facts were that the named insured in the policy was killed while riding in the insured vehicle which was being operated by a permissive user at the time. The Court of Appeals ruled that because the exclusion, which limited coverage, was contained in an endorsement did not "camouflage" the exclusion so as to be unenforceable.

SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Co., ____ Ga. _____, Case No. S99Q1575 (2/28/00). An exclusion in an umbrella policy barring coverage for bodily injuries or personal injuries sustained by an insured’s employees, which arose out of and were sustained in the course of their employment, should not bar coverage for an employee’s sexual harassment claims since sexual harassment is not a risk of employment that a reasonable person would foresee, and does not arise out of employment. This case involved a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court. After reviewing the issue, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the exclusion did not exclude coverage for sexual harassment claims. In deciding this issue, the Georgia Supreme Court looked at the terms "in the course of" and "arising out of." The term "in the course of" employment has been defined as relating to the time, place, and circumstances under which an injury takes place. The term "arising out of" has been defined as involving a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Sexual harassment claims have previously been held not to "arise out of" employment even where they occur "in the course of" employment. Murphy v. ARA Services, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 859, 861, 598 S.E.2d 528 (1982), andPotts v. UAP-Ga. Ag. Chem., 270 Ga. ____, 506 S.E.2d 101 (1998). For an injury to "arise out of" employment, the injury must be a risk of employment that a reasonable person could have foreseen due to the nature of the work. This definition does not include injuries to which an employee would have been exposed outside of the employment context, but only injuries that arise as a proximate result of the particular nature of the employment. Since sexual harassment is caused by "willful acts of a third person for personal reasons", it has been held as not "arising out of" employment. Although the sexual harassment in this particular case may have occurred "in the course of" employment, it did not "arise out of" employment. As a consequence, and because the exclusion used the conjunction "and", the court held that the exclusion did not apply to a sexual harassment claim.

LOCAL VERDICTS

Strickland v. Allstate Ins. Co.. In this case, Allstate Insurance Company was hit with a $520,000.00 verdict in a bad faith action brought by one its insureds. The underlying facts were that Allstate Insurance Company refused to settle a claim arising from an automobile accident. The insured’s policy limits were $25,000.00. Before trial, the plaintiff made a policy limits demand of $25,000.00. Allstate made a counteroffer of $7,500.00. The plaintiff’s accident related medical expenses were $3,600.00 with a related loss wage claim of $5,000.00. The trial verdict was $60,000.00. After the verdict, the plaintiff again offered to settle for the insured’s policy limits of $25,000.00. Allstate refused and renewed its earlier offer of $7,500.00 before an appeal. The appeal was unsuccessful and the insured filed a bad faith action against Allstate for its failure to settle the claim within policy limits. At the trial of bad faith action, the jury awarded the insured damages totaling $520,000.00. The verdict breakdown was $45,000.00 in compensatory damages and $475,000.00 in punitive damages. The punitive damage award will in all probability be reduced to the statutory maximum of $250,000.00. This is a fairly good example of what can happen to an insurance company after a trial in which its insured is hit for an excess verdict, and the company then refuses to accept a settlement demand within policy limits. In the event the appeal of the underlying verdict is unsuccessful, it is fairly easy to predict that a subsequent bad faith jury will find that the only interest being protected by the filing of the appeal (rather than accepting the policy limits settlement demand) was that of the insurance company. Under applicable Georgia law, insurance companies are obligated to give their insured’s interests equal consideration to that given to the company’s interests.

Davis v. Piedmont Hospital. In this case, which was decided in the State Court of Fulton County, a jury awarded $1.15 million to a plaintiff who slipped and fell in 1992 at Piedmont Hospital. The apparent cause of the fall was some algae, mold or fungus, which had accumulated on some steps and had become slick when wet. The plaintiff was walking down the steps, slipped, and fell. In addition to breaking her left ankle and

injuring her back, the plaintiff aggravated a previous neck injury for which she had previously had three cervical fusions. Medical expenses totaled $189,000.00.

*** Caution ***

The above case summaries are provided as a service by this firm but in no way should be used as a substitute for case by case analysis. We have tried, where appropriate, to indicate "cert. granted" or "cert. pending". It should be understood, however, that this newsletter is published once each quarter and is based on decisions by the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals which have been published in time to be included. The newsletter does not reflect opinions which may have been decided but not published as of our cut-off date for mailing the newsletter. For that reason, you should not rely on a case note published in the newsletter without first verifying that the pertinent decision has not been reversed, modified, etc.

M & M News

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USELESS FACTOIDS

• Since its first appearance in 1912, OREO Chocolate Sandwich Cookies have reigned supreme as being the number one selling cookie in America. The basic design of the cookie has not changed for more than 50 years. Today’s version is a neat 1-3/4 inches across — that’s one, two or three bites, depending on how big your bite is!
• The creme filling used in one year could ice all the wedding cakes served in the United States for two years! That’s 4,724,000 three-tier wedding cakes.
• The 362 billion OREO cookies sold to date would fill up the world’s largest freight train, consisting of 660 freight cars, over 62 times.
• If every OREO cookie ever made were stacked on top of each other (over 362 billion), the pile would reach the moon and back more than five times. If placed side-by-side they would encircle the earth 381 times at the equator!
• If all the OREO cookies sold to date were stacked on top of each other, the height of the stack would be equivalent to the height of 9.8 million Sears Towers. The Sears Tower is 1,454 feet tall.
• If every OREO cookie eaten in a given year were dunked, cows would have to work overtime to produce the extra 42.2 million gallons of milk needed to accommodate the extra dunkers.

YOUR TYPICAL DAY IN COURT!!

These are things people actually said in court, word for word, taken down and now published by court reporters who had the torment of staying calm while these exchanges were actually taking place.

Q. What is your date of birth?

A. July fifteenth.

Q. What year?

A. Every year.

Q. What gear were you in at the moment of the impact?

A. Gucci sweats and Reeboks.

Q. This myasthenia gravis, does it affect your memory at all?

A. Yes.

Q. And in what ways does it affect your memory?

A. I forget.

Q. You forget. Can you give us an example of something that you’ve forgotten?

Q. How old is your son, the one living with you?

A. Thirty-eight or thirty-five, I can’t remember which.

Q. How long has he lived with you?

A. Forty-five years.

Q. What was the first thing your husband said to you when he woke that morning?

A. He said, "Where am I, Cathy?"

Q. And why did that upset you?

A. My name is Susan.

Q. Were you present when your picture was taken?